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“It is clear that the past conduct [of Credit Rating Agencies] cannot
be repeated.”1 – Luis A. Aguilar, SEC Commissioner
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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to analyze, critically review, and determine
whether a hypothetical credit rating agency board, as suggested in the Franken–
Wicker Amendment to the Dodd–Frank Act, is a viable option for combating the
conflict of interest problem between credit rating agencies and issuers. Research
methodology includes a careful review of various ways to structure the board
and the potential unintended consequences of doing so. The Author uses
original research hand-collected from video of the Credit Ratings Roundtable
conducted in Washington D.C. on May 14, 2013. The Credit Ratings
Roundtable brought together experts from the credit rating industry and
government to discuss the viability of a credit rating agency board. After
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reviewing the research, the paper concludes, while the credit rating agency
board will be difficult to implement and may have various negative unintended
consequences, it is currently the best option available to break the conflict of
interest.
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers, one of the United States’
largest and most respected investment banks filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
protection.2 The Lehman bankruptcy was the largest in the United States in
terms of total debt by more than $500 billion dollars.3 Shortly after the collapse,
the financial markets entered a period of rapid decline.4 While the causes of the
great recession are varied, the ultimate result was the worst financial crisis in the
United States since the Great Depression. Nearly six years later, the United
States’ economy has still not fully recovered, and many are still suffering from
its devastating effects.5
One catalyst often pointed to, as a cause of the financial crisis, was the
massive deterioration of the real estate market beginning in 2007.6 Due to an
array of factors, including prolonged low interest rates, aggressive sales tactics
of mortgage originators, and the bundling of complex mortgage-backed
securities, the United States experienced an incredible real estate bubble during
the early 2000s. Many believe one reason for the crisis was credit rating
agencies (CRAs), which rate debt instruments in an attempt to judge the ability
of repayment, massively overrated securities backed by residential mortgages.7
CRAs have had an important role in the financial markets since the early
Twentieth Century and help deal with the issue of asymmetric information in
financial markets.8 Currently, three CRAs: Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and
Fitch, collectively, the “Big Three,” rate the vast majority of security and debt

2

Sam Mamudi, Lehman Folds with Record $613 Billion Debt, MARKETWATCH (Sept. 15, 2008,
10:11 AM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/lehman-folds-with-record-613-billion-debt.
3
Id.
4
See Crash Course, ECONOMIST (Sept. 7, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/schoolsbrief/
21584534-effects-financial-crisis-are-still-being-felt-five-years-article.
5
Id.
6
See James B. Bexley, et al., The Financial Crisis and Its Issues, 3 RES. BUS. & ECON. J.1, 3
(2011) (noting "the pain" experienced during the crisis became apparent as underlying real estate
values plummeted).
7
See Gary Gorton, The Subprime Panic, 15 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 10, 32 (2009).
8
Marwan Elkhoury, Credit Rating Agencies and Their Potential Impact on Developing
Countries, 186 UNITED NATIONS CONF. ON TRADE AND DEV. 1, 2–3, (2008), available at
http://www.unctad.org/en/Docs/osgdp20081_en.pdf.
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issuances—rating 95% of all issuances.9 One particular issue identified after the
crisis was the perverse conflict of interest created by a system that allows the
issuers of securities to choose the CRA that will ultimately provide a rating
analysis for the security.10 Because issuers seek the highest rating possible for
an issue, which allows them to market to more investors, CRAs were seen as
being incentivized to provide the best rating, rather than an accurate rating.11
Investors, in particular financial institutions, pensions, and other institutional
investors, were forced by regulators to use CRA ratings when building
investment portfolios.12 Therefore, many investors had little choice but to invest
in securities rated investment grade by the CRAs, regardless of their own riskbased credit analysis.13
Senators Al Franken (D-Minn) and Roger Wicker (R-Mass) proposed one
possible solution to the conflict of interest problem, which has received a lot of
attention. The Franken–Wicker Amendment to Dodd–Frank, proposes a Credit
Rating Agency Board (Board) under the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC). The Board’s purpose is to break the conflict of interest by assigning a
CRA to an issuer rather than allowing the issuer to choose a CRA.14 While the
amendment initially passed the Senate by a wide majority, outcry from the credit
rating industry resulted in the amendment’s removal from Dodd–Frank.
After Congress removed the amendment from the bill, the SEC undertook
a study to determine the viability of creating the Board.15 Following the study’s
release, Senators Franken and Wicker hosted the Credit Ratings Roundtable in
Washington D.C. on May 14, 2013. Senators Franken and Wicker brought the
CRAs together with government entities to discuss the possibility of creating the
Board. Portions of the Credit Ratings Roundtable are found throughout this
paper and, to date, have never been written about.
This article analyzes a hypothetical Board using the language in the
9
Christopher Alessi, Roya Wolverson & Mohammed Aly Sergie, The Credit Rating
Controversy, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., http://www.cfr.org/financial-crises/credit-ratingcontroversy/p22328 (last updated Oct. 22, 2013).
10
See, e.g., Rupert Neate, Ratings agencies suffer ‘conflict of interest’, says former Moody’s
boss, GUARDIAN (Aug. 22, 2011), http://www.theguardian.com/business/2011/aug/22/ratingsagencies-conflict-of-interest.
11
Id.
12
Emily M. Ekins & Mark A. Calabria, Policy Analysis: Regulation, Market Structure, and Role
of the Credit Rating Agencies, 704 CATO INST. POL’Y ANALYSIS 1, 12–27 (2012), available at
http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/PA704.pdf.
13
Id.
14
Press Release, Al Franken U.S. Senator for Minn., Sens. Franken, Wicker Push SEC to
Implement Credit Ratings Industry Reform (July 24, 2013), available at http://www.franken.senate.
gov/?p=press_release&id=2514.
15
See Michael Hirsh, Al Franken Gets Serious, NEWSWEEK, July 5, 2010, http://www.
newsweek.com/al-franken-gets-serious-74561.
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Franken–Wicker Amendment as a baseline. The goal of the article is to review
the hypothetical Board from the perspective of how it may function and perform
in the credit rating markets and determine whether the Board is a viable
alternative to the status quo. The hypothetical Board creates many complexities,
new problems, and conflicts of interest; however, the Board is likely more
desirable than the status quo. The Board is not the only possible solution to the
problems inherent in the credit ratings industry, but it received a significant
amount of attention during the discussions in Congress following the crisis and,
therefore, is the subject of this article.
Part I gives a brief account of the role of CRAs in the financial markets,
the role of CRAs in the financial crisis, the issuer-pays model, and the proposed
reforms to the credit rating industry.16 Part II analyzes the structure of the Board
as outlined under the Franken–Wicker Amendment and the possibility of
creating an assignment system.17 After reviewing several possibilities, Part II
raises some unforeseen problems the system may create.18 Part III concludes by
arguing while the Board will create additional bureaucracy and complexity, it is
better than doing nothing at all and is the only proposal that directly breaks the
conflict of interests.19
A. The Role of Credit Rating Agencies in Financial Markets and The
Lead-Up to the Franken-Wicker Amendment
Accurate information is the lifeblood of an efficiently functioning and
healthy financial market. CRAs were born in the early 19th Century to fill an
information void and provide desperately needed information on the health of
railroad companies.20 This information was needed because some investors in
railroads were suffering severe losses.21 Though financial markets have grown
in complexity since the early days of credit rating, the CRAs continue to operate
as gatekeepers in the financial markets.22 CRAs gather financial information
from the issuers of debt instruments, then analyze, interpret, and disseminate
information on the likelihood of repayment. These assessments are relative
measures of creditworthiness.
CRAs have historically avoided making

16

See infra Part I.A–D and accompanying notes 21–82.
See infra Part II.A–B and accompanying notes 83–131.
18
See infra Part II.C and accompanying notes 132–203.
19
See infra Part III and accompanying notes 204–207.
20
See HERWIG LANGOHR & PATRICIA LANGOHR, THE RATINGS AGENCIES AND THEIR CREDIT
RATINGS: WHAT THEY ARE, HOW THEY WORK, AND WHY THEY ARE RELEVANT 1 (Wiley 2010).
21
Id.
22
See Steven L. Schwarz, Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox,
2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 2 (2002).
17
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guarantees of creditworthiness and, thus, have avoided liability on free speech
grounds when ratings prove to be inaccurate. 23
The CRAs perform three main functions.24 First, CRAs are designed to
measure credit risk.25 Second, CRAs provide a means of comparison between
different securities issues.26 Finally, CRAs provide the markets with a common
standard to judge credit risk.27 CRAs derive their value from the well-recognized
fact markets contain asymmetric information. The borrower is eager to receive
the loan and, therefore, is incentivized to provide information to the lender that
is favorable for the borrower. The lender, on the other hand, would prefer to get
all of the information—good and bad—about the borrower so the lender can
make the appropriate risk calculations. In short, the borrower is much more
likely to know whether it can repay, but the lender is rightly skeptical.
The CRA, when performing its job efficiently, steps into this
informational void and acts as an agent for the investor. A CRA’s value lies in
its expertise analyzing information not available to the typical investor. Rather
than requiring individual investors to trust the information given to them by the
potential borrower, investors are able to rely on the expertise of the CRAs when
determining the creditworthiness of a borrower. The CRAs issue ratings that are
easy for the common investor to understand and are given on a grading scale
similar to educational institutions. For example, Standard and Poor’s has a
credit rating scale that starts at “AAA” for issues deemed to be the least risky to
“D” for issues already in default.28 When the CRAs can accurately predict the
credit quality of a lender, the value of the credit analysis is positively correlated
to the complexity of the financial product and the available information about
the firm or economy. In other words, as the complexity of the information
increases because the information is hard to prove, easy to manipulate, or just
generally is difficult to understand, the more valuable an accurate rating from a
CRA.
Furthermore, relying on CRAs is more useful for individual investors who
may have limited resources to spend on credit analysis. The larger players in
debt markets such as pension funds, financial institutions, and mutual funds are

23
Theresa Nagy, Credit Rating Agencies and the First Amendment: Applying Constitutional
Journalistic Protections to Subprime Mortgage Litigation, 94 MINN. L. REV. 140, 142 (2009).
24
LANGOHR & LANGOHR supra note 21, at 89–91; Stephen Harper, Credit Rating Agencies
Deserve Credit for the 2007-2008 Financial Crisis: An Analysis of CRA Liability Following
Enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, 68 WASH. LEE L. REV. 1925, 1931 (2011).
25
Harper, supra note 25, at 1931.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Credit Ratings Definitions and FAQ’s, STANDARD AND POOR’S, http://www.standardandpoors
.com/ratings/definitions-and-faqs/en/us (last visited on Feb. 24, 2014).
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more likely to have the resources to perform their own detailed credit analysis.
However, for decades the government mandated through regulations these large
institutional investors invest in debt securities highly rated by the CRAs.29
Therefore, even the most sophisticated investors were required to rely on ratings
from the CRAs, regardless of their own analysis of a particular issuer’s credit. 30
B. The Role of Credit Rating Agencies During the Financial Crisis
The financial crisis of 2007–2008 resulted in hundreds of billions of
dollars in investor losses, a massive $700 billion bailout of Wall Street banks,
and the collapse of some of Wall Street’s most storied institutions.31 Much of
the crisis was the direct result of the packaging and selling of securitized
residential mortgage products. The CRAs had a significant role in this process.
Because of the massive profits available to issuers who could securitize
mortgages, CRAs served an important gatekeeping role.32 A favorable rating
from a CRA was critical to issuers because it gave them a regulatory license to
sell to large institutional investors who were required to invest only in securities
rated investment grade.33
Moreover, the CRAs were much more involved with issuers over
mortgage-related financial products.34 CRAs consulted extensively with issuers
and discussed with them ways to earn higher ratings for their products.35 The
result was issuers began to conform their practices to fit the CRAs’ model for
investment grade ratings.36 This, in turn, allowed the issuer to sell to larger
groups of investors, ultimately leading to higher profits. As a result of this
arrangement, CRAs earned approximately three times the fee revenue for rating
mortgage securities than they did for traditional corporate and government
bonds.37
29
See e.g. Rolf H. Weber & Aline Darbellay, The Regulatory Use of Credit Ratings in Bank
Capital Requirement Regulations, 10 J. BANKING REG. 1, 4 (2008) (noting the requirement that
banks use CRA ratings when determining capital requirements began in the 1930s).
30
See id.
31
Phillip Swagel, The Cost of the Financial Crisis: The Impact of the September 2008 Economic
Collapse, PEW ECON. POL’Y GROUP, at 1, 4 (2009).
32
See Josh Wolfson & Corinne Crawford, Lessons from the Current Financial Crisis: Should
Credit Rating Agencies be Re-Structured?, 8 J. BUS. & ECON. RES., 85, 86–87 (2010).
33
See id.
34
Lawrence J. White, Markets: The Credit Rating Agencies, 24 J. ECON. PERSP. 211, 220
(2010).
35
Id.
36
See id.
37
Elliot B. Smith, Bringing Down Wall Street as Rating Let Loose Subprime Scourge,
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 24, 2008), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?sid=ah839IWTLP9s&pid=
newsarchive.
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If the CRAs were providing accurate ratings and fulfilling their role of
bridging the asymmetric information gap, one could say the ends justified the
means. However, the CRAs’ judgment on the creditworthiness of many
mortgage securities was grossly inaccurate. Prior to the financial crisis, CRAs
rated thousands of mortgage securities.38 The vast majority of these securities
received an AAA rating, the highest possible rating for a security.39 Even
though an AAA rated security historically has a 1% default rate, 90% of the
securities rated between 2006–2007 were later downgraded to below investment
grade.40
The resulting downgrades wreaked havoc on financial markets as
investors tried to sell off securities as their value plummeted.41 As values
declined, large financial institutions were forced to write down over $500 billion
in debt on their books.42 These write-downs, in part, led to the collapse or
selling off of some of Wall Street’s most storied institutions including Lehman
Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and Bear Sterns.43 As confidence in financial
institutions’ ability to pay back loans faltered, the credit market began to seize
up.44 Unable to get access to credit to pay for daily operations, many businesses
failed, which further contributed to the financial crisis.45
In response to the financial crisis, Congress passed the Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act also known as “Dodd–Frank.” The Act describes
its purpose as to “Create a Sound Economic Foundation to Grow Jobs, Protect
Consumers, Rein in Wall Street and Big Bonuses, End Bailouts and Too Big to
Fail, Prevent Another Financial Crisis.”46 As part of the slew of reforms
included in the Act, the drafters included provisions to reform the credit rating
agency industry.

38
Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at the Credit Ratings Roundtable
(May 14, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/credit-ratings-roundtable.shtml.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
See Rachelle Younglai & Sarah N. Lynch, Credit Raters Triggered Financial Crisis: Panel,
REUTERS (Apr. 13, 2011, 7:38 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/13/us-financialregulation-report-ratingage-idUSTRE73C8GX20110413.
42
Smith supra note 38.
43
Id.
44
Kirk Shinkle, America’s Credit Catastrophe, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP. (Oct. 3, 2008, 5:31
PM),
http://money.usnews.com/money/business-economy/articles/2008/10/03/americas-creditcatastrophe.
45
Id.
46
Press Release, Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Jun. 29, 2010),
available at http://democrats.financialservices.house.gov/press/PRArticle.aspx?NewsID=1306.
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C. Proposed Reforms to Credit Rating Agencies
The government sought to reform credit rating agencies by including in
Dodd–Frank provisions meant to address the CRAs’ historic failure in properly
rating mortgage securities.47 The goals of Dodd–Frank are important to the
hypothetical Board because they provide the baseline from which all formation
and performance decisions are measured. A successful Board must meet the
broad policy goals of Dodd–Frank while at the same time being cognizant of the
blowback any structural decisions create. Therefore, the Board must be careful
not to solve one problem and, in the process, create other unforeseen
consequences that undermine the purposes of Dodd–Frank.
The reforms have two primary goals. First, Dodd–Frank seeks to
ultimately reduce investor reliance on CRAs and incentivize institutions to rely
on their own independent credit risk analysis.48 Investors simply put too much
stock in what the rating agencies said about securities. This reliance, in some
ways, was artificial because the government began institutionalizing CRAs into
the financial system as early as the 1930s.49 The second goal of Dodd–Frank,
with regard to CRA regulation, was to improve the quality of credit ratings
conducted by the CRAs.50 Decreasing reliance is not enough because many
investors will likely continue to use CRA ratings.
To achieve the goals of reducing reliance on CRAs, Dodd–Frank began
the unraveling of decades of regulations making reference to CRAs. The
culmination of this process resulted in the removal of references to CRAs in a
series of SEC and OCC regulations.51 This included an amendment to the
definition of “investment grade.”52
Prior to the enactment of the regulation under Dodd–Frank, banks were

47
See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, §
931, 124 Stat. 1376, 1872 (2010).
48
Ben Protess, S.E.C. Seeks to Reduce Reliance on Credit Ratings, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2011,
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/02/09/s-e-c-aims-to-reduce-reliance-on-ratings/.
49
See GILBERT HAROLD, BOND RATINGS AS AN INVESTMENT GUIDE: AN APPRAISAL OF THEIR
EFFECTIVENESS 160–72 (1938); Frank Partnoy, Historical Perspectives on the Financial Crisis: Ivar
Kreuger, The Credit-Rating Agencies, and Two Theories About the Function, and Dysfunction of
Markets, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 433, 439 (2009).
50
See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, supra note 48, § 931.
51
Press Release, Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, SEC Removes References to NRSRO Ratings in
Certain Rules and Forms (Dec. 27, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/Press
Release/Detail/PressRelease/1370540564425#.VCdhJytdXLR; Press Release, Julie L. Williams,
First Senior Deputy Controller and Chief Counsel, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
Alternatives to the Use of External Credit Ratings in the Regulations of the OCC (Jun. 26, 2012),
available at http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/bulletins/2012/bulletin-2012-18.html [hereinafter
Office of the Comptroller].
52
Office of the Comptroller supra note 52.

88

BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW

Vol. VIII:I

allowed to exclusively rely on the ratings of CRAs in determining the
investment quality of a security. After the promulgation of the rules, banks are
allowed to use external CRAs as one factor in determining investment quality.53
However, the inquiry no longer ends there.54 To fully comply with the
regulation, financial institutions “should supplement any consideration of
external ratings with due diligence processes and additional analyses that are
appropriate for the institution’s risk profile and for the size and complexity of
the instrument.”55 Essentially, lawmakers wanted to encourage institutions to
perform independent credit analysis and gave them the breathing room to do so
by eliminating the requirement to rely exclusively on CRA ratings.
The Dodd–Frank’s second purpose was to improve the quality of credit
ratings. In this regard, Dodd–Frank took several approaches including greater
internal controls,56 more expansive and accessible disclosure of ratings,57
increased liability for CRAs,58 a whistleblowing duty,59 and greater
independence in corporate governance.60 One of the most discussed issues are
CRAs’ expanded procedures dealing with the conflict of interest problem.61
Addressing the conflict of interest is the primary objective of the Franken–
Wicker Amendment;62 however, the performance of the Board must be judged
on how it interacts with the goal of reducing investor dependence on credit
ratings.
D. The Conflict of Interest and Issuer Pays Model
The issuer pays model, where the issuer of a debt instrument seeks out and
pays the CRA to provide a rating, was not always the standard in the industry.
In the early days, the CRAs provided ratings to issuers free of charge. CRAs
received their revenues from the sale of credit rating publications to investors.63

53

Id.
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id. § 932(a)(2)(B)(3).
57
Id. § 932.
58
Id. §§ 932(a)(1)–(3), 933, 939G.
59
Id. § 934.
60
Id. § 932(a)(8).
61
Id. § 932.
62
Press Release, Al Franken, U.S. Senator for Minn., Sens. Franken, Wicker Push SEC to
Implement Credit Rating Industry Reform (Jul. 24, 2013), available at https://www.franken.senate.
gov/?p=press_release&id=2514.
63
Richard Cantor & Frank Packer, The Credit Rating Industry, 5 J. FIXED INCOME 10, 14
(1995), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/quarterly_review/1994v19/v19n2article1
.pdf.
54
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This was known as the user pays model. The transition away from the user pays
model was brought about in large part because of Penn Central Transportation
Company’s $82 million commercial paper default in 1970.64 Prior to that event,
investors typically assumed any company with a household name was likely a
good credit risk.65 The Penn Central default caused investors to question the
quality of commercial paper even for large, well-known firms.66 Unwilling to
take this risk, investors withheld their funds causing a liquidity crisis in the
commercial paper markets.67
The lack of investor funds caused many companies who relied on the
commercial paper markets to fail.68 To counteract the lack of confidence, the
companies began to actively seek credit ratings on their debt issuances from
CRAs.69 As demand for ratings from issuers increased, CRAs saw an
opportunity to charge the issuers directly for credit ratings on debt.70 By the
early 1970s, the Big Three were all charging issuers directly for credit ratings.71
This shift in business model also coincided with the SEC introducing the
Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization (NRSRO) designation,
which was incorporated into many regulations.72 The standardization of CRAs
and their ratings into regulations institutionalized CRAs, making their ratings
more valuable to issuers.73 This perpetuated the issuer pays model many believe
created the conflict of interest the Franken–Wicker Amendment seeks to
remove.
The issuer pays business model creates an inherent conflict of interest.
Prior to the 1970s, the CRAs received the majority of their revenues from
subscription fees.74 Today, CRAs receive between 90 to 95% of their revenues

64

Id.
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
See Marcin Kacperczyk & Phillipp Schnable, When Safe Proved Risky: Commercial Paper
During the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009, 24 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 43 (2010), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w15538.pdf (noting investors interpreted the Lehman Brothers
bankruptcy as a signal commercial paper issued by financial institutions was riskier than originally
thought).
69
Cantor & Packer, supra note 64, at 14.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Emily M. Ekins & Mark A. Calabria, Policy Analysis: Regulation, Market Structure, and Role
of the Credit Rating Agencies, CATO INSTITUTE POL’Y ANALYSIS No. 704, 1 (Aug. 2012), available
at http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/PA704.pdf.
73
Id.
74
Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for the Credit
Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 620 n.3 (1999).
65
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directly from the issuers whose securities they are rating.75 Some scholars see
the adoption of the issuer pays model as creating a situation where the CRA is
incentivized to provide the rating its customer desires.76 Rather than trying to
provide the most accurate ratings, the CRA may be looking forward to the next
deal.77 If the CRA were to provide a rating not favorable to the issuer, whether
more accurate or not, the issuer would be less likely to hire the CRA for future
deals. With the CRA dependent on the issuers for the vast majority of their
revenues, the CRA would be more hesitant to provide a rating unfavorable to the
issuer.
The argument CRAs are incentivized to provide desired ratings is well
taken but possibly overblown. If all the CRA wanted to do was please issuers,
then every rated deal would receive an AAA or its equivalent rating. However,
not every deal receives the highest rating. It follows: there must be some market
constraints on CRAs to provide accurate ratings. That said, the CRAs’ incentive
to look toward the next deal and provide investment grade ratings exists and is
likely a partial cause of inflated credit ratings.
In a properly operating credit ratings market, perception of reputation
among investors should incentivize CRAs to produce accurate credit ratings.78
However, the SEC's designation of NRSROs unintentionally created an
oligopolistic market for credit ratings.79 The lack of competition allowed for
greater credit rating market complacency and, coupled with inflated market
demand caused by government regulatory pressures, forced institutional
investors to value CRA ratings.80 Thus, investors continued to rely on CRAs
despite the decreasing informational value of their ratings.81
II. THE FRANKEN–WICKER AMENDMENT POSES ONE POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO THE
CONFLICT OF INTERESTS PROBLEM
One proposed regulatory solution to the issuer pays model is known as the
Franken–Wicker Amendment. This amendment, originally passed in the Senate
as part of the Dodd–Frank Act, sought to create a credit rating agency review
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board within the SEC.82 The Board would be responsible for assigning an issuer
to a credit rating agency for each issue, rather than letting the issuer choose the
rater.83 With the incentive to look toward the next deal removed, the CRA will
be more likely to provide an accurate rating, regardless of the desires of the
issuer.
The Franken-Wicker Amendment largely leaves the design of the Board
up to the SEC,84 though the amendment does provide several guidelines. For
example, the amendment prescribes the Board should be made up of an odd
number of members.85 The amendment requires the members of the Board
include at least one representative each from the CRAs,86 the securities issuers,87
and an “independent” member.88 In addition, the amendment specified,
regardless of the total number of board members, investors must represent a
majority of the board.89 While the amendment received a fair amount of
attention, no scholarship exists on how the Board might be implemented or
designed. Furthermore, no scholarship exists that examines what implications a
Board may have on the credit rating and financial markets.
The amendment received broad support in Congress and passed the Senate
by a 64-35 margin.90 With the relatively large Senate majority supporting the
amendment, it would have been easy to believe the amendment would likely
pass the House. However, the amendment did not make the final version of the
bill.91 Ironically, in conference committee, Congressman Barney Frank
removed the amendment from Dodd–Frank.92 Rather than pass the amendment,
Congressman Frank thought there were too many questions as to what the
consequences of creating the Board would be.93 The Senators reached a
compromise and decided to strip the amendment from Dodd–Frank but
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commission the SEC to perform a study on what the Board might look like and
what the effects of the Board might be.94
A. Other Possible Solutions to the Conflict of Interest Do Not
Adequately Address the Problem
The Franken–Wicker Amendment is not the only option available to deal
with the conflict of interest. It is likely some industry participants will argue the
Board creates too many unintended consequences and will pervert financial
markets. At the Credit Ratings Roundtable, Reginald Imamura, Chairman of the
Board for the Structured Finance Industry Group, argued for another solution.95
Mr. Imamura believes better regulatory oversight coupled with enforcement of
17 C.F.R. § 240.17(g)(5) would be more effective.96
Regulation 240.17(g)(5) prohibits CRAs with a conflict of interest with an
issuer from offering a rating unless the conflict is disclosed and the CRA “has
established and is maintaining and enforcing” written policies and procedures to
manage the conflict.97 While this proposal has the benefit of not complicating
the system with additional bureaucracy and expense associated with the Board,
it still puts the onus on the CRAs to manage the conflict of interest. In essence,
the effect of this proposal would be to continue the status quo as it does not
introduce additional competition, and Mr. Imamura does not discuss how the
proposal results in more accurate ratings. Indeed, at least one scholar argues the
regulation simply does not go far enough.98
Another proposal discussed by Martin Hughes, Chief Executive Officer of
Redwood Trust Inc., is to retain the status quo but mandate no CRA can rate two
deals in a row from the same issuer.99 The proposal has an appealing sound
because it would eliminate the need for a bureaucratic board. However, the
proposal does not deal effectively with the conflict of interest. If the issuers are
still allowed to choose CRAs to rate deals, the CRAs will still be incentivized to
provide desired ratings rather than accurate ones. All the proposal does is shift
the incentive from the next deal to the deal after the next deal.
A more recently proposed solution, by scholar Robert Rhee, suggests a
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small portion of revenues earned by the Big Three should be confiscated and put
into a separate fund.100 The government could then use this fund to pay for a
“pay-for-performance” bonus each of the agencies would compete for on a
periodic basis.101 Rhee believes such a system would significantly reduce the
conflict of interest problem, increase competition, and subsequently increase the
quality of the ratings.102
The bonus proposal is interesting because it requires little regulation and
would only marginally upset the current system. The flaw in the proposal is it
does not account for a rogue rating agency who refuses to compete for the
bonus. If we assume CRAs are in fact competing for business on the basis of
providing desired ratings, it stands to reason a rater who does not vie for the
bonus could focus on gaining market share by providing desired ratings to
issuers. Presumably, this practice would be quite lucrative as issuers would
choose the rating agencies that did not seek to win the bonus. Either the
redistribution of revenues would have to be so high as to make it impossible not
to play, or only the least profitable rating agencies would compete for the bonus.
Thus, Rhee’s proposal may in fact increase the incentives for the Big Three to
provide desirable ratings over accurate ones to make up for the lost revenues.
The remainder of this section looks at the proposed Board as written in the
Franken–Wicker Amendment and analyzes what affect the Board would have in
the markets.
B. The Structure of the Credit Rating Agency Review Board as Articulated
in the Amendment Helps Break the Conflict of Interest but Has Many
Unintended Consequences
The Franken–Wicker Amendment instructs “[t]he Board shall initially be
composed of an odd number of members selected from the industry.”103
Specifically, the amendment calls for a Board made up of “not less than a
majority” of members from the “investor industry who do not represent
issuers.”104 The amendment further instructs the remaining members should be
composed as follows: not less than one member should represent issuers,105 not
less than one member should represent the CRAs,106 and not less than one
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member should be “independent.”107 While the amendment clearly presents
some guidance on how the Board should be structured, it does not articulate why
the Board should be structured this way. Furthermore, the amendment fails to
articulate the consequences of a Board structured this way and, therefore, gives
the SEC a great deal of latitude in designing the Board. A more in depth
analysis is needed to determine the incentives created by structuring the Board
as instructed in the amendment.
1. The Amendment Uses the Make-Up of the Board to Shift the
Power Balance from the Issuers to the Inventors but Fails to
Account for Unintended Consequences
The first provision requiring the Board to be made up of an odd number of
members for the creation of the Board seems fair enough. It makes perfect
sense for the Board to consist of an odd number of members so a tie vote for a
given decision is not possible. Though, it is worth articulating there is no
provision discussing what happens if one of the members is not allowed to vote
for some reason.108 For example, it may be because of, ironically, a conflict of
interests between a Board member and a decision, the member may need to
abstain. This may particularly be true because the amendment calls for
members to be “from the industry.”109 To address such an event it may be
necessary to include alternate members for each category in the event of a tie.
The amendment gives the power to address these issues to the SEC
provided its ultimate decision is not “in contravention with the intent” of the
amendment.110 Given the broad language of the statute, the SEC could take any
number of courses. One option would be to delegate the authority to make these
decisions back to the Board. The benefit of this course of action is the Board
itself likely has more information about the idiosyncrasies and, therefore, would
be more likely to craft an efficient solution. On the other hand, putting the
Board in charge of these decisions may create the perception of cronyism and
undermine the legitimacy of the Board.
The second issue to address is the amendment’s charge requiring the
majority of the Board to be made up of the “investor industry.”111 The conflict
of interest, as seen by many, including the sponsors of the amendment, is the
move from the investor pays model to the issuer pays model created an inherent
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conflict of interest.112 Under the investor pays model, the CRA acts as agent for
the investor seeking out credit information from issuers. After retrieving this
information, the CRA analyzes and disseminates an opinion as to the
creditworthiness of the debtor to the investor. However, under the issuer pays
model, this relationship is perverted.
Rather than incentivizing the CRA to provide accurate ratings to investors,
the model incentivizes CRAs to provide favorable ratings to the issuer. A
favorable rating from a CRA all but guarantees the issuer’s securities will be
sold. The reason is a favorable rating essentially grants the issuer a “regulatory
license”113 to sell to institutional investors. The concept of granting regulatory
licenses derives from 1936 when the OCC and the Federal Reserve mandated
banks could not hold securities rated below investment grade by at least two
CRAs.114 The effect of this ruling was more than half of the nearly two
thousand publicly traded bonds issued failed the regulators’ new test and could
no longer be held by banks.115 Some scholars have argued this move by the
regulators shifted the CRAs’ incentive of providing accurate ratings to providing
regulatory licenses.116 Issuers now needed to seek investment grade ratings
from the CRAs to have the regulatory license to sell to financial institutions.
This is important because financial institutions make up a large share of the
bond markets.
The amendment attempts to shift the balance of power back to the
investors by giving them a majority on the new Board.117 This seemingly
benign and logical directive can have incredible consequences and, therefore,
must be approached carefully. The first issue is what does the amendment mean
by “investor”? There are a multitude of different investors who rely on CRA
credit analysis and neither the amendment nor Dodd–Frank provides any
guidance regarding how to interpret this important term.118
When the average person hears the word “investor,” the person likely
thinks of a worker saving for retirement. In one sense, this is accurate because
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most individual investors invest in mutual funds.119 Mutual funds, like other
institutional investors, pool large amounts of investor funds and then use those
funds to invest in securities.120 The basic idea is a small individual investor,
who cannot otherwise diversify his or her assets because of a lack of funding,
can pool assets with many other investors. As a whole, the holders of the
mutual fund shares are able to purchase a diversified portfolio of assets that are
professionally managed by the fund manager.121 Mutual funds make up a large
portion of the institutional investor class holding $26.8 trillion in assets as of
2012.122 Other institutional investors include insurance companies, pension
funds, private equity funds, and hedge funds. These investors wield vast power
in the financial markets because they not only retain the best talent and have vast
amounts of funds at their disposal, but this talent affords them a reputation for
deep investment knowledge.
The varied nature of the “investor industry” brings up a key issue in the
design of the Board. The Franken–Wicker amendment is silent on which
investors will be represented on the Board. A representative from all of the
“investor industry” constituencies may be impractical. However, the Board will
decide issues that affect the entire class. Some of these decisions will
undoubtedly affect some investors negatively and others positively and to
different degrees. Having at least one member representing each type of
institutional investor may cause the Board to be inefficient. The members may
fight over various proposals slowing down the business of the Board and
potentially preventing issuers from getting their products into the markets in a
timely fashion.
However, not having each member represented may disadvantage the
unrepresented. The result may be appointment to the Board will become a
coveted position within the industry. This may encourage cronyism, or at worst
corruption, in an attempt for the institutional investor class to ensure a seat at the
Board. For example, it is likely a position on the Board would be a way to
secure future employment with one of the member constituencies. Because a
position with a private firm may be financially lucrative, appointment to the
Board would be desirable. The competition for appointment to the Board may
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lead to the selling of seats by those capable of selecting membership.
Furthermore, the “investor industry” membership constituency will likely
need to include a member who represents individual investors. If for no other
reason than for appearances, given the political climate and general negative
image of Wall Street following the recent crisis, the public may find it hard to
legitimize a Board made up of Wall Street’s biggest investors. The appointment
of a member to represent the general public may be a good idea for public
perception, though the value of such a member on the function and performance
of the Board may be minimal.
2. The Use of a Rotating Board with Term Limits Can Help
Mitigate Some Problems Raised by the Exclusion of Some
Investor Constituencies but may Result in a Less Efficient
Board
The amendment gives the SEC the authority to “establish fair procedures
for the nomination and election of future members.”123 This gives the SEC the
flexibility to adjust the process for electing a new board and provides
opportunity to correct some of the problems inherent in designing the Board. A
possible, though imperfect, solution to this problem would be to create a rotating
board with each member subject to term limits. The SEC could focus on the
overall make-up of the Board rather than on the individual members in an
attempt at a more “fair” Board. Under this system, members of the Board would
serve for a short term staggered at specific time intervals.
At the conclusion of each member’s term, a new Board member would be
appointed from a different class of investors. As previously noted, it would be
preferable for the individual investor class to have a constant presence on the
Board to help quash the appearance of investor elitism. While during any given
term there would still be incentives for each investor to favor his or her investor
constituency, the idea is over time this should even out as other investors rotate
onto the Board.
It should be noted this is also a flawed, imperfect solution. While a
rotating Board with term limits may seem fair, it would be inefficient. One
particular concern is experience. With a new group of Board members rotating
in every few years, the experience of the outgoing Board will generally be lost.
The new members will have to be brought up to speed on what is in front of the
Board at the time they arrive. There could be unresolved pressing issues that
were before the outgoing Board. As it is likely the markets will be reacting to
any news from the Board, the disruption of an incoming Board in the middle of
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an important decision could create inefficiencies in the market. The rotating
Board could become too bureaucratic and unwieldy with inexperienced—with
respect to the Board—Board members slowing down progress every few years.
Even in the case where you allow previous Board members to rotate back in, it
is likely the issues before the Board will have substantially changed. This will
further impede the efficiency of the Board’s operations.
The same criticisms discussed above apply to the remaining composition
of the Board as mandated by the amendment. The amendment calls for at least
one Board member to represent the issuers,124 one to represent CRAs125 and one
“independent” member.126 There are a variety of issuers including Goldman
Sachs, Chase, and the other large Wall Street banks. As we have seen, in
addition to the Big Three, there are also smaller companies.127 Having a
member who is or was an executive from any particular issuer or rating agency
presents its own conflict of interest problem. The perception will be the member
is biased toward his or her former or current employer. Thus, the SEC will need
to devise some strategy to ensure corruption, cronyism, and inefficiencies are
minimized when composing the Board.
A particular area of concern that must be discussed is what the amendment
means when it calls for at least one “independent” member. The Black’s Law
Dictionary definition of “independent” is: “not subject to the control or
influence of another.”128 Presumably, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to
meet this standard if choosing from within the industry. The term implies the
perception of independence as much as it does actual independence from
influence. It is difficult to imagine a former industry insider as “independent”
from the influence of the industry whether that industry is investor, issuer, or
CRA. Furthermore, having a politician on the Board is also counterintuitive to
the concept of independence. In particular, the financial industry gives large
sums of money for political campaigns.129
One possible solution to the influence of money on the politician is to
prohibit a politician, perhaps a Congressional Senator or Representative, who
serves on the Board from accepting campaign contributions from the financial
industry. However, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to find a politician who
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has not received significant amounts of money from this industry in the past. In
fact, the financial industry is the largest donor for fifty-seven of one hundred
senators and one hundred fifty-nine of four hundred thirty-six House
members.130 This fact limits the field of political candidates for the position
significantly. Moreover, it is likely the most qualified politicians for this
position would have some financial background. Logically, it seems likely a
candidate with such a background would have already been courted by the
financial industry.
Excluding industry insiders and politicians leaves the possibility of a
private citizen who has business, organizational, or academic experience to fill
this role. It is unclear how the SEC would go about selecting such an individual.
It is important to note any selection would still face the already discussed
hurdles of cronyism, corruption, experience, and public perception. It is highly
unlikely the SEC could find a truly “independent” board member with the
required skills to meaningfully participate on the Board. However, the fact an
independent Board member will never be perfect should not dissuade the Board
from doing the best it can to find an independent member.
C. The Assignment of a Credit Rating Agency to an Issuer
The ultimate goal of the CRA Board is to break the conflict of interest by
assigning a CRA to an issuer rather than allowing the issuer to choose the CRA.
The Franken–Wicker Amendment directs the Board to “evaluate a number of
selection methods, including a lottery or rotating assignment system . . . to
reduce the conflict of interest that exists under the issuer-pays model.”131 The
method of the assignment system brings up several concerns including what
institution has the expertise to design the system, how best to design a system
that addresses the conflict of interest, how to design the system to minimize
unintended consequences, and how to design a system that increases
competition in the credit ratings markets.
1. The Board is the Ideal Institution to Design the Assignment
System Because Board Members Have a Broad Knowledge
Base and Have a Vested Interest in the Success of an
Assignment System
The first consideration is whether the Board is the correct entity to choose
the assignment method. Other possible choices would be the SEC or Congress.
130
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Among these choices, the use of the Board to create an assignment system
seems best. The primary concern when deciding who should design the
assignment system is competence. While the SEC most likely has staff familiar
with the various issues and positions of the constituents, it seems unlikely the
SEC is more competent than the Board. Regarding Congress, it is unlikely the
institution has the requisite financial knowledge or the resources to undertake
the design of the assignment system. Therefore, the Board is likely the best
choice for the design of a CRA assignment system that would break the conflict
of interest inherent in the status quo.
First, the composition of the Board contains a much broader base of
knowledge to draw on when designing the system. Because the Board will be
compromised of investors, CRA representatives, issuer representatives, and an
independent member, it is less likely relevant issues will be overlooked. The
use of the Board and its proposed composition is particularly important given
the main goal of breaking the conflict of interest. Recall the source of the
conflict is the direct payment for rating services by issuers to the CRAs.132
Because the amendment specifically requires a majority of the Board consist of
representatives from investors, it is more likely any assignment system will
favor investors over issuers.
Furthermore, neither the SEC nor Congress has a direct financial stake in
the implementation of the assignment system. For the purposes of proper
incentives, it makes more sense to leave the design of the assignment system to
the actors who will be most affected. The most pressing concern is whether
doing so will produce the unwanted result of favoring certain actors over others.
However, because the amendment calls for a Board with a variety of
constituents, the majority of which are investors, the Board is probably the best
choice to design the process.
2. Increasing Competition in the Credit Ratings Industry
Without Addressing the Conflict of Interest Will Not Lead to
More Accurate Ratings
One concern is what impact the assignment system will have on
incentivizing competition between CRAs. The regulators have long recognized
creating more competition among the CRAs is one way to help control the
conflict of interest.133 If the rating agencies are forced to compete with each
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other, the firms are more likely to produce accurate ratings. However, under the
current issuer pays system, researchers have cast some doubt on the likelihood
increased competition alone would increase accuracy.134 It may be increasing
the number of CRA firms in the market increases competition. However, what
they compete over is very important. Some research suggests when there is
increased competition in the CRA markets, the firms compete not for accurate
ratings but for repeat business from the issuers.135 Thus, without breaking the
conflict of interest inherent in the issuer pays model, increased competition may
exacerbate the problem.
One empirical study by the Harvard Business School suggests increased
competition alone is unlikely to improve the CRA system.136 The study used the
rise of Fitch as an example of increasing competition in the system.137
Ultimately, the study found stronger competition led to three results.138 First, as
Fitch’s market share increased, the bond ratings actually moved further toward
the higher end of the ratings spectrum.139 This evidence suggests the increased
competition from Fitch caused CRAs to provide more favorable ratings to
issuers in an attempt to secure more business. It should be noted, however,
more empirical analysis is needed on the actual cause of the increase in
favorable ratings, which may or may not be directly tied to increased
competition.
Second, the ratings given were not actually correlated with the ultimate
yield on the corporate bonds issued.140 In other words, the information provided
in the ratings appeared to not influence the yield offered in the bond offering. It
could be the presence of Fitch simply had no effect on the accuracy of ratings or
the ratings offered by Fitch were comparable to ratings by Moody’s and
Standard & Poor’s. However, this data suggests the ultimate investors in
corporate bonds did not believe the increased competition resulted in more
accurate ratings.
Finally, firms whose bonds were ultimately downgraded saw unexpectedly
severe drops in the price of their securities.141 The researchers took this to
mean, because ratings agencies tended to favor positive ratings, a drop in the
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rating meant there must be a really significant problem with the company.142
One conclusion from the study is increased competition actually further
perpetuated the conflict of interest problem.143 Credit ratings firms still
competed on bottom line ratings, not accuracy, and, thus, the issuers had the
upper hand.
Possibly the most important problem the Board can correct is shifting the
paradigm from competing for business to competing for accurate ratings and
innovation in the art of rating credit. As the Harvard Business Study points out,
the increase in competition in the market when Fitch became prominent caused
lower quality less accurate ratings.144 The article does not say directly it is
because the CRAs were competing for business. However, given the monetary
incentives, oligopolistic market structure, and conflict of interest in the status
quo, it is a reasonable conclusion. The Board, if it can break the conflict of
interest, will go a long way to reforming the system by changing the baseline.
Without breaking the conflict of interest, increased competition will merely
exacerbate the problem as more CRAs compete for business from issuers.
The move to an assignment system will, even with all bureaucratic
problems noted, break the conflict of interest problem with respect to issuers
choosing CRAs to rate their products. It may seem counterintuitive, however, to
argue a cold government assignment system would increase competition. After
all, it seems the antithesis of competition for the Board to select winners who
will earn substantial fees from rating securities.
However, the Board does have the ability to create a more competitive
environment, particularly in an oligopolistic system. Oligopolies are typically
defined as industries with high barriers to entry that limit competition in the
market.145 The credit ratings market is one where barriers to entry, such as
brand name, experience advantage, and economies of scale, are prevalent.146
Further complicating the issue was the SEC’s creation of the NRSRO
designation. Any credit rating firms not designated NRSROs are destined to be
ignored by investors.147 With investors ignoring non-NRSROs, issuers had little
use for the firms, as an “investment grade” rating did not grant the issuer a
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regulatory license to sell to institutional investors.148
The Board presents the SEC with the opportunity to correct the
unintentional creation of an oligopoly within the credit ratings industry. The
first step is to break the conflict of interest, to shift the paradigm from
competing for business to competing for accurate ratings. The Board is the only
proposal that unequivocally accomplishes this primary objective of Dodd–
Frank. Once the conflict of interest is broken, the Board can level the playing
field by creating a system that encourages and provides incentives for smaller
CRAs to gain experience. By doing so, the Board creates an environment where
it is more likely the Big Three will face real market competition.
3. The Assignment System May Create New Unintended
Conflicts of Interest, but These Conflicts are More Desirable
Than the Issuer-CRA Conflict
Another issue regarding the assignment of CRAs by the Board is the
selection method. Douglas Peterson, President of Standard & Poor’s Rating
Service, believes there must be two components to an assignment system.149
First, the initial assignments must be random to avoid the problem of moral
hazard.150 Mr. Peterson did not articulate why random assignments would
prevent moral hazard. However, it is a reasonable assumption if a CRA knew it
would be selected, there would be no need to focus on accurate ratings, rather
than a desirable rating. The CRA could continue to take the risk of providing
desirable ratings with less fear an inaccurate rating would prevent selection in
the future. Thus, the cost of providing an accurate rating that may not be
desirable for an issuer is left to “other” rating agencies.
Second, the Board must be careful not to create a series of metrics that
tells the CRAs how to build their ratings models.151 It would not be beneficial to
the credit ratings system to have government actors instructing CRAs on how to
perform credit ratings. The credit ratings business is far too complicated with
multiple industries and economic variables to have a “one size fits all”
government solution. Rather, the Board should only create metrics that judge
the results of various ratings by CRAs on two or three important pieces of data,
such as the level of default and the number of ratings that go from “investment
grade” to “below investment grade.”152
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Reginald Imamura, Chairman of the Board for the Structured Finance
Industry Group, voiced similar concerns with the assignment system.153 For
example, Mr. Imamura pointed out, while the assignment system may break the
conflict of interest between the issuers and the CRAs, it may create a conflict of
interest between the Board and the CRAs.154 Though Mr. Imamura did not
explain exactly what he meant by a conflict of interest between the Board and
the CRAs, it seems likely he was referring to the CRAs’ desire to please the
Board, rather than provide accurate ratings.
If this is the case, Mr. Imamura raised an interesting idea. While it is
currently unclear how the Board will be designed, it is relatively easy to see how
a conflict may arise between the Board and the CRAs. In the same way the
issuers decide which CRAs will rate securities under the current system, the
Board and its policies will decide how CRAs are selected for lucrative ratings.
Because it is likely an assignment system will be based on a computer algorithm
that selects CRAs based on a series of criteria, it is likely clever CRAs will
decipher the selection criteria and skew their ratings in an attempt to influence
selection.
The incentive to influence the selection process by catering ratings to the
algorithm may be an unintended consequence of the assignment system. The
underlying question is whether the new assignment system is a better outcome
than the current system. If the algorithm is based primarily on various
performance measures of CRAs, it stands to reason this type of conflict is more
desirable than one based on providing particular investment grade ratings. The
new system would be particularly better because the old system seems to
incentivize firms to ignore accuracy of ratings when there is a higher risk of
default and honor ratings when there is a low risk of default.
Though empirical data is certainly needed, the new system will at least
provide some incentive for firms to provide more accurate ratings. To do this,
the Board must design an assignment system that rewards firms for more
accurate ratings and punishes firms with inaccurate ratings. Firms who are
better at making accurate default predictions will be rewarded by a higher
likelihood of selection for future deals, while firms who are less accurate will
have a lower probability of selection. The financial rewards of selection should
be enough incentive to encourage accuracy and innovation. This should result
in a more even distribution between high and low default ratings. It is also
worth noting, while it is easy to pontificate on both sides of the argument,
without instituting the assignment system, the counterfactual necessary for
empirical research is difficult to replicate.
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4. The Board Can Create an Environment That Allows New
CRAs to Enter the Market and Increase Competition
The problems faced by smaller CRAs in the current market were
articulated by Jules Kroll at the Credit Ratings Round Table in Washington D.C.
in May 2013.155 Mr. Kroll, who is the CEO of Kroll Bond Ratings, a relatively
small CRA, stated the “little guys” face significant obstacles to rating deals.156
Discussing the difficulty of obtaining the expertise necessary to rate securities in
different business sectors, Mr. Kroll noted each category can take anywhere
from nine to twelve months to gain the required expertise.157 The long time
period needed to research a given industry can cost millions of dollars.158
Mr. Kroll’s point regarding the costs of training staff and gaining expertise
in particular areas can be partially dealt with by aggressive hiring practices. The
labor force of financial experts does not exist in a vacuum. It is common in the
financial industry for employees to move among several firms during their
career. The primary issue Mr. Kroll addressed is not staff related, but rather
opportunity related. Without the prestige and financial benefits associated with
working for the Big Three, it would be difficult for the smaller agencies to
attract top talent.
Mr. Kroll went on to discuss the barriers to competition. According to Mr.
Kroll, there are two big obstacles to entering the credit rating business. First, the
established CRAs do not welcome competition.159 Instead, they frequently “take
shots” at the smaller agencies to dissuade investors from trusting their ratings.160
Second, but related, Mr. Kroll stated the biggest obstacle is the investment
management guidelines for issuers.161 Put simply, according to Mr. Kroll,
certain institutions will not hire rating agencies that are not Moody’s, Standard
& Poor’s, or Fitch.
Mr. Kroll’s point is well taken with regard to investment management
guidelines. Banks, bondholders, pension fund trustees, and other institution
investors use investment management guidelines to make investment
decisions.162 As a result, credit ratings play an important role in portfolio
governance because many investment management guidelines limit the quality
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of assets money managers can invest in to those rated “investment grade” by
CRAs.163 However, rather than refer to credit quality generally, most
investment management guidelines refer to investment ratings by the Big
Three.164 For example, in one survey of two hundred investors from Europe and
the United States, 72% of fund managers’ investment management guidelines
referred to specific CRAs by name.165 Of those who did so, almost all referred
to Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s, and 70% referred to Fitch.166 Only 9%
referred to CRAs generally, and only 25% referred to NRSROs in general. 167
The Board can provide several ways to deal with this issue. One
possibility is, by assigning CRAs to issuers, the Board opens up the ratings
market to the smaller CRAs who otherwise would not be selected by the issuer.
Mr. Kroll alluded to this idea in his testimony. By arguing the current system
results in significant barriers to entry, Mr. Kroll implied the Board could
actually result in increased competition in the industry. It seems likely, because
the Board’s assignment system beaks the conflict of interest problem, the issues
brought up in the Harvard Business School study may be rectified. Without the
threat of exclusion of CRAs by issuers hanging over their head, the CRAs’
incentives may shift, ceteris paribus, from competing for business to competing
for accuracy. However, this will of course depend on how the Board devises the
assignment system. It will be paramount the system rewards accurate ratings
with a greater probability of selection for future deals.168
5. The Board Must Create an Assignment System That Allows
the Smaller CRAs to Gain Experience so They Can Compete
with the Big Three in the Credit Ratings Market
The SEC must be careful however in considering such a drastic solution to
the conflicts of interest problem as an assignment system. While in theory the
move to an assignment system could increase competition for accurate ratings, it
also raises several practical issues that must be addressed. First, artificially
increasing the market share of smaller CRAs is not done without possible
consequences. While, Mr. Kroll implied issuers seek out the Big Three CRAs
because of name recognition, those from within the large CRAs argue they
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simply have more expertise.169
It is hardly arguable analyzing and rating securities is a complicated
business that has many variables. In addition to financial statement analysis, the
CRAs must also be familiar with the business model. This familiarity
necessarily includes knowing what the current concerns and opportunities are in
a given industry, as well attempting to anticipate future issues or
opportunities.170 Insiders and analysts argue the Big Three simply have more
experience in the various industries and, thus, are in a better position to rate the
securities accurately and efficiently.171
In short, the Big Three argue the smaller firms do not have the necessary
expertise to rate certain securities.172 The lack of expertise will be a significant
challenge for a credit rating board tasked with assigning a variety of CRAs to
the thousands of securities that need ratings each year. Without some
mechanism to provide less experienced CRAs the opportunity to expand into
other industries, the Board may end up assigning the Big Three to the many
security issues. Assigning the majority of the most complex securities to the Big
Three seems to subvert the very purpose of increasing competition. If the Board
is not careful, it may end up furthering the oligopoly and reducing further the
influence of smaller CRAs. It is worth noting, even if this were the case, the
conflict of interest would still be lessened because the issuers would still not
select which CRAs rate their deals. The real concern is there would be no
incentive for the Big Three to innovate and provide more accurate ratings that
would benefit investors.
a. The Board Can Create an FDIC-Style Fund to Pay for Smaller
CRAs to Gain Experience and Expertise
The need to provide smaller CRAs with the experience necessary to
properly rate securities in the variety of industries necessary to encourage
competition presents an interesting problem. It would seem not only unfair but
also potentially inefficient and disastrous to allow CRAs with little experience to
rate particular securities for issuers. After all, the issuers have significant
investments in their packages of securities and, in large part, rely on CRAs for
regulatory licenses.
Some commentators, including Arthur Bolden, discussed the possibility of
creating a system that allows inexperienced CRAs to receive the training
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necessary to compete.173 One possible solution is to create an FDIC-style
insurance fund the proceeds of which could be used to pay for CRAs to
participate in issuances they were otherwise unqualified to rate. The smaller
CRAs would receive the same information as the issuer chosen to officially rate
the deal; however, their ultimate rating would not be released to the public.174
Ideally, this would result in a system where less experienced CRAs could
receive the training necessary to rate future deals without harming the financial
system directly.
Regardless of training, the fund could be used to provide a useful check
regarding the accuracy of credit ratings and incentivize CRAs to provide more
accurate ratings. One possibility, given the Board’s regulatory discretion, is to
set up a randomized supplemental rating system. The idea behind the system is
to provide for at least one independent secondary rating for a randomized
sample of issues. Indeed David Raboy, Chief Economic Consultant at Patton
Boggs LLP, made a similar suggestion by stating at least two CRAs should be
assigned to each issue.175 Using funds derived from a tax on each rating agency,
the Board would set up a system in which certain issues received a “secret”
rating from another CRA.
The purpose of implementing such a system is to incentivize CRAs
assigned to an issue to provide the most accurate ratings possible. Another
possibility is the secret rating may encourage innovation on the part of the
officially selected rater and the secret rater. In both cases, the Board could
incentivize the firms to provide more accurate ratings by making increased
accuracy a pretext to a greater likelihood for selection on future issues. The
Board can make the assignment system account for accuracy by designing an
algorithm that solves for experience and past performance.
b. The Board Must Mandate Issuers to Use Board Provided CRA
Ratings, but This May Create Other Unintended Consequences
Another issue is the Franken–Wicker Amendment does not bar issuers
from seeking ratings outside of the new Board. Indeed the amendment
explicitly states “[n]othing in this section shall prohibit an issuer from
requesting or receiving additional credit ratings.”176 This language undercuts the
effectiveness of the Board. Because the process of removing the regulatory
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requirements for investors to use investment grade ratings by CRAs has begun,
there is no reason for the issuers to not go outside of the Board. It would,
therefore, be useful for the Board to implement a regulation requiring such
investors to receive an investment grade rating from a CRA through the Board’s
assignment process.
Furthermore, requiring investors to receive investment grade ratings from
CRAs through the Board’s assignment system may interfere with the first goal
of Dodd–Frank regarding CRAs—making investors less dependent on CRA
ratings.177 Along the same lines, a requirement to use ratings given through the
assignment system may give investors the impression the government sanctions
the ratings given through the assignment system. Opponents of the Board have
articulated the unintended consequence of increasing investor reliance on CRAs
as one reason to not implement the amendment.178
During the Credit Ratings Roundtable, Mr. Bolden introduced another
complication: What happens if the CRA selected to rate the issue simply is not
interested?179 It may be, because of a lack of expertise and an unwillingness to
invest to gain expertise, a particular CRA may not want to rate certain types of
securities. The Board should consider whether to force CRAs to rate whichever
securities are assigned to them as a condition of participating in the Board’s
selection process.
Another possibility is it may be useful to have CRAs that specialize in
certain industries. Specialization would likely benefit the system because a
CRA may over time become so good at rating certain industries it becomes the
preferred CRA for the Board on those issues. If the Board consistently chooses
the same CRA for certain issues, it would introduce anti-competitiveness back
into the system and pervert the purpose of the Board.
However, Stephen Hall, securities analyst with Better Markets Inc.,
pointed out the situation where there are a limited number of CRAs in the
system will not persist.180 Put simply, because of the vast amounts of money
that can be made rating securities, competition for ratings should fill voids in the
ratings market.181 If one firm is making a significant amount of money
specializing in one area of the market, other firms will seek to compete in those
markets. Over time the increased competition will result in multiple CRAs
within the various industries.
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The existing Big Three are likely to put up a significant amount of
resistance to a secret system. One objection that is immediately apparent is the
secret system perverts competition in the free market. By collecting revenues
from each CRA based on a percentage of total revenues, the Board would
essentially be redistributing money from the more successful CRAs to the less
successful ones.
Though empirical research is necessary, this may provide a disincentive
for CRAs because portions of their profits are being taken away. However,
given the lucrative business of credit ratings it seems likely these concerns may
be overblown. Even if CRAs continue to be motivated to participate in the
assignment system, it may be firms seek to rate credit for issuers outside of the
system. While the Board will not sanction the ratings offered outside of the
assignment system, investors may come to trust the ratings outside of the
assignment system. A vibrant rating market outside of the Board’s system
would likely create legitimacy concerns and may result in a de facto issuer pays
model.
D. Measuring Performance and the Benefits of Standardization in the
Industry
If the Board is to provide a system that rewards accuracy and
performance, it is necessary for the Board to define the parameters of
performance. A particular area where the Board could offer the benefits of
standardization is in the area of CRA performance evaluation. The current
reporting system for CRAs is substantially inconsistent across the industry.182
To properly compare the performance of CRAs across a variety of industries,
the CRA reporting elements must be consistent.183 There is currently no
consistency requirement at the regulatory level for performance evaluation tools
such as symbols, industry specifications, and definitions.184 The result of the
inconsistency is measuring performance of CRAs is very difficult.185
Lin Bai identified four areas of inconsistency across the CRAs. First,
there is inconsistency at the broadest sector rating level.186 For example,
Standard & Poor’s divides ratings into five sectors including “corporate
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issuers.”187 The corporate issuers sector is made up of industrial companies.188
Compare this with a smaller CRA, such as Ratings & Investment Information,
Inc. (R&I). R&I also has a corporate issuers category that includes financial
institutions in addition to industrial corporations.189 A&M Best further
complicates the category by including mostly insurance companies in the
corporate issuers category.190 It becomes apparent very quickly an investor who
wanted to compare CRAs in this category would first have to sift through the
data to create consistent criteria. The investor would essentially have to sort
through millions of rows of Microsoft Excel data before even attempting to run
a statistical analysis.191 Similar inconsistencies exist when comparing the debt
issuers industry sector, when comparing across geographic regions, and among
the ratings symbols used among firms.192
In this area the Board can provide for standardization across CRA
reporting metrics. The results of the standardization would be two-fold. First,
increased standardization across CRAs would provide investors with a more
useful and efficient method to judge the performance of CRAs across industry
sectors. The result is investors could more easily determine which CRAs are
most accurate for each of the given standardized sectors.
Arthur Bolden, a financial analyst with fifteen years of experience in
complex financial instruments, agrees.193 While Mr. Bolden is not a proponent
of the Board, he does think tying CRA performance to compensation is an
appropriate endeavor.194 The regulatory authority of the Board to provide for
standardization is one method to better judge CRA performance. However, it is
plausible to institute a standardization regime through other regulatory means
without the creation of the CRA Board. For example, the SEC, as the chief
regulator for CRAs could simply promulgate new rules requiring standardization
within the industry.
The second benefit is a standardized process would provide the Board
with a more efficient method of evaluating CRA performance. If the purpose of
the Board is to incentivize firms to seek the most accurate ratings and, therefore,
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encourage creativity and innovation, there must be some way to evaluate the
performance of the CRAs against each other. The Board must have a system in
which it is able to reward CRAs who consistently outperform their peers by
increasing the likelihood of being assigned to new issues. The result would be a
complete revision of the “compete for business” versus “compete for accuracy”
dichotomy. Increased business would come from accurate ratings—not from
providing particular ratings.
However, one particular issue the Board will have to deal with regarding
standardization is whose measure of standardization to use. One option is for
the Board to choose one of the existing rating agency’s methods of evaluating
performance. However, doing so may create an advantage for that particular
agency. If performance measurements are one method by which the Board will
select who gets assigned to particular issues, forcing all but one CRA to adopt
new methods will create a competitive disadvantage for those firms.
Furthermore, adopting one CRA’s performance methods will provide an
opening for opponents of the Board to attack the Board on bureaucratic
efficiency grounds. While no empirical evidence exists, it seems likely the costs
of adopting a new measurement process will be high. First, it will likely cost
CRAs significant amounts of money to reorient their information collection and
reporting methods. This will be particularly true for the smaller CRAs, which
do not have the resources to undertake such a project. Second, it will likely take
a significant amount of time for the CRAs to comply with the new requirements.
In a financial system that issues thousands of debt instruments in need of a
rating, this time lag could significantly slow down the process and create
inefficiencies.
The second option for the Board is to create an entirely new system of
performance measurement. While this system may seem more “fair” because it
would apply to all CRAs, it too suffers from the same issues of cost and
efficiency. Furthermore, it is unclear how such a performance system could be
designed and who the designer would be. It stands to reason any designer will
be subject to immense pressures from the industry to design a system to benefit
a particular style of measurement. Therefore, regardless of the type of
performance standardization the Board chooses, it will be subject to charges of
corruption, inefficiency, and illegitimacy.
Another issue regarding performance measure has to do with the fact
different investors have different measures. Sanjeev Handa, Managing Director
at TIAA-CREF, pointed out this issue at the Credit Ratings Roundtable.195 As
an example, Mr. Handa stated a bond issued in 2007 at a certain credit spread
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might have been downgraded by a CRA in 2009.196 As a result of the
downgrade, different investors may have had difference reactions.197 One
investor may have immediately sold the bond as a result of the downgrade while
another may have decided to wait out the crisis.198 As the market improved, the
bond’s value may have increased above the 2007 level.199 As a result, because
of a different time horizon preference, one investor made money while the other
lost money.200
The issue presented by this hypothetical is how to assess the performance
of the CRA. Did the CRA get it wrong when it gave the bond a high rating in
2007? Did it get it right when it downgraded the bond in 2009? Or, did it get it
wrong when it downgraded because the bond ultimately recovered? Security
performance is dependent upon multiple variables not directly in the control or
knowledge of the CRA.201 Mr. Handa argued ratings should be just one measure
of performance and there should be no bright line test—market conditions,
performance of the economy, and risk tolerance also matter in judging
performance.202
Mr. Handa’s argument highlights the complexity of credit rating analysis.
To measure performance, the Board must derive some baseline to start the
analysis. One response to Mr. Handa is the hypothetical he proposed takes place
in an economic environment where the majority of securities were failing.
When the economy experiences a significant decline overall, it is easy to see
how judging the decisions of CRAs is difficult because economic decline is hard
to predict. It would be much more reasonable to state CRAs should be judged
during more stable economic conditions because attributing cause and effect is
much easier. However, Mr. Handa’s point is well taken. Any performance
system will have to address the baseline and account for fluctuations due to
unforeseen economic circumstances before assessing CRA rating performance.
III. CONCLUSION
In the wake of the greatest financial crisis since the Great Depression, the
public was rightly outraged. Many commentators and industry professionals
blamed CRAs for their inability to accurately rate mortgage-backed securities in
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the lead up to the crisis.203 As a result, Congress had a kneejerk reaction seeking
to implement new legislation to prevent a future crisis.204 One part of
Congress’s overall strategy was to regulate the CRA industry more heavily.205
The Franken–Wicker Amendment passed the Senate with strong bipartisan
support.206 The creation of a credit rating agency review board to assign issuers
to CRAs has appeal. It is widely recognized the conflict of interest inherent in
the issuer pays model has negative consequences for the accuracy of credit
ratings.
However, the implementation of the Board and the assignment system will
come at some cost. If the SEC is to implement such a system, it must first
address the myriad of concerns ranging from lack of expertise to restricting
competition within the credit rating markets. While an imperfect solution, it
seems unlikely there is a perfect solution. No regulation is perfect, but no
regulation needs to be perfect to be effective. Without reforms, the mistakes of
the CRAs that contributed to the financial crisis are sure to be repeated.
The Board will undoubtedly create new problems ranging from the
inefficiencies of bureaucracy to questions about the competence of CRAs
assigned to issuers. However, the Board will break the conflict of interest by
removing the CRAs’ financial incentives to provide issuers with the ratings they
desire. If properly designed, the Board can also increase competition among
CRAs by providing opportunities to CRAs who do not get many opportunities to
rate securities in the current system. The CRA industry will be forever changed
by the implementation of the Board. It can, therefore, rightly be expected to
receive a great deal of criticism and push back from Wall Street. It certainly
may be the Board will ultimately fail. However, the system needs a significant
overhaul, and, of the options being discussed, the Board is the most viable
option.
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